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Abstract—Publish and subscribe (pub/sub) system is a decou-
pled communication paradigm that allows routing of publica-
tions. Through a set of dedicated third party servers, referred to
as brokers, publications are disseminated without establishing
any link between publishers and subscribers. However, the
involvement of these brokers raises security and privacy issues as
they can harvest sensitive data about subscribers. Furthermore, a
malicious broker may collude with malicious subscribers and/or
publishers to infer subscribers’ interests. Our solution is such
that subscribers’ interests are not revealed to curious brokers
and published data can only be accessed by the authorised
subscribers. Moreover, the proposed protocol is secure against
the collusion attacks between malicious brokers, publishers, and
subscribers.
Index Terms—Pub/sub, Subscribers’ Privacy, Publications’
Confidentiality, Collusion Resistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Publish and subscribe (pub/sub) system is a decoupled com-
munication paradigm that allows data broadcasting without
any link between the sender (a.k.a. publisher) and the receiver
(a.k.a. subscriber). In pub/sub systems, subscribers register
their interests in published data (a.k.a. publications) generated
by publishers through a set of constraints on these data
(a.k.a. subscriptions). Publications are routed to the interested
subscribers using a network of dedicated servers referred to as
brokers. A publication is composed of a set of tags defining
a set of keywords that characterise the data content. Brokers
match the publications’ tags against the stored subscriptions
to identify the interested subscribers. Then, the brokers filter
and forward the publications to the subscribers.
Despite the benefits of pub/sub systems, they also raise se-
curity and privacy issues as the subscriptions and publications
are stored and routed via dedicated brokers that could be com-
promised, hacked, or sniffed by adversaries [1], [2]. Indeed,
publishers/subscribers may send/receive sensitive publications
such as military data, health information, religious, or political
interests. Thus, compromised brokers could collect sensitive
information about the publishers and subscribers.
Encryption techniques are usually applied to protect sensi-
tive information against untrusted parties in pub/sub systems.
For instance, in [3]–[5], subscribers encrypt their subscriptions
before registering at brokers, and publishers also encrypt pub-
lications and tags before forwarding to the brokers. Moreover,
the brokers can match the subscriptions against the publica-
tions’ tags on encrypted form without learning their content.
However, few research works have considered the collusion
attacks between malicious subscribers and brokers [6]–[8].
Indeed, a malicious broker may collude with a compromised
subscriber to register her subscriptions in cleartext. Using
these subscriptions, the broker can still learn information about
honest subscribers’ interests by checking if they match against
the same publications as the compromised subscriptions.
Another limitation facing pub/sub systems is the collusion
between brokers and publishers. State of the art works do not
consider the publisher as an untrusted entity [9]–[11]. Specifi-
cally, a malicious publisher may collude with a compromised
broker to publish a compromised publication. By identifying
the subscriptions that match the compromised publication, the
broker and the publisher are able to infer the subscribers’
interests.
Above all, to guarantee confidentiality of both the publica-
tions and subscriptions sufficiently, a secure pub/sub system
has to satisfy the following requirements:
R1. The published data should be protected from brokers
and unauthorised subscribers, i.e., the publications
should not be accessed by brokers and unauthorised
subscribers whose interests do not match the publi-
cations’ tags, even if they collude together.
R2. The broker should be able to check if subscribers’
interests match the publication tags without knowing
their content, which can reveal information about the
content and subscriptions.
R3. A publisher should not be able to trace subscribers,
i.e., publishers and subscribers should be loosely-
coupled.
R4. The broker should not be able to know the sub-
scribers’ interests, even if it colludes with malicious
subscribers or malicious publishers.
In this paper, we provide a privacy-preserving pub/sub
system that meets all the requirements. Basically, to meet R1,
we encrypt publications using the key policy attribute-based
encryption scheme. Furthermore, we apply a Searchable En-
cryption (SE) scheme to enable encrypted matching between
tags and subscriptions (i.e., R2 and R3). The main idea to
achieve R4 is to employ multiple types of brokers and divide
the matching operations between encrypted subscriptions and
tags into different phases, where each phase is performed by
a different type of broker. Each broker type only processes
partial information from which sensitive information about
encrypted interests can not be inferred. Thus, if a broker is
compromised or colluding with a subscriber or a publisher,
the subscriptions are still protected.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
reviews related work. We present system model, threat model,
and a brief overview of our approach in Section III. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
In pub/sub systems, it is crucial to protect publications’
contents from unauthorised access. In addition, subscribers
may want to keep their interests hidden from other subscribers
as well as brokers. To deal with these issues, several research
works have proposed various schemes to protect subscribers’
interests against curious brokers.
In [12], Ion et al. present a pub/sub system that ensures
confidentiality of publications and subscriptions. Their scheme
allows the publishers to express fine-grained access control
on the publications by applying Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) [13] on the payload. Moreover, their scheme supports
multi-user access without requiring the publishers and sub-
scribers to share any key. However, their scheme is vulnerable
to collusion attacks. That is, when the broker colludes with a
malicious subscriber or publisher, they can infer the subscrip-
tions of an honest subscriber.
In [14], Naveel et al. present an approach based on both
symmetric and asymmetric schemes. Specifically, the pub-
lication payload is encrypted with a symmetric algorithm,
and both tags and filters are encrypted with the Paillier
homomorphic cryptosystem [15], such that the brokers can
perform privacy-preserving matching over encrypted data. This
solution offers confidentiality of publications and subscrip-
tions. However, it breaks the de-coupling property of pub/sub
system, since the subscribers have to communicate with pub-
lishers to get the subscriptions blinded. This issue has been
solved in [16] by using modified Paillier cryptosystem and
Attribute-Based Group Key Management (AB-GKM) scheme
[17]. However, these solutions fail to prevent the broker from
inferring the subscriber’s interests by colluding with malicious
subscribers or publishers.
Crescenzo et al. [18] design a 3-party pub/sub protocol
that safeguards privacy of subscriptions and publications while
guaranteeing performance of the system. In the protocol, both
interests and tags are encrypted with 2-layer cryptographic
pseudonyms, and the encrypted tags and interests are seman-
tically secure. A trusted third party server is employed to
perform the second layer of encryption. Due to the assistance
of the third party, the broker is able to test the equality
between encrypted tags and interests efficiently. However, in
this protocol, the publication payload is encrypted with a key
shared among all the subscribers and publishers, which will
put all the publications at risk when the broker colludes with
a malicious subscriber or publisher.
PIDGIN [19] has been proposed to ensure subscriptions’
privacy and publications’ confidentiality in pub/sub systems. In
this proposal, the publication payload is encrypted using CP-
ABE with respect to access structures. The publication tags
and subscriptions are encrypted using public-key encryption
with keyword search (PEKS) [20], so as to the broker could
perform the matching over them without requiring access the
content. However, if the broker colludes with the subscriber,
the broker will be able to infer the interests of honest sub-
scribers.
Yang et al. [9] introduce a dual-policy attribute-based en-
cryption scheme that ensures an efficient keyword search in
cloud-based pub/sub systems. In this proposal, the publisher
defines an access policy over the publications’ keywords
while the subscriber sets a different access policy through its
interests. In this solution, the publishers are considered fully
trusted, the subscribers are malicious and the cloud server
is curious. Moreover, they assume that the subscribers can
collude together to access the publications but can not collude
with the cloud server.
In [21], Borcea et al. propose PICADOR, a secure topic-
based pub/sub system based on the use of a proxy-re-
encryption scheme. The authors apply a lattice-based proxy
re-encryption scheme that allows partial homomorphic opera-
tions. That is, the brokers have to re-encrypt the publications
such that the authorised subscribers could recover the plaintext
of these publications. However, this re-encryption increases the
computation overhead significantly on the broker end, and the
topic of each publication is sent to the broker in plaintext.
Although the aforementioned solutions ensure the publi-
cations’ confidentiality, they do not consider the privacy of
subscriptions against colluding brokers and subscribers [6].
In fact, a malicious subscriber can share her subscriptions in
cleartext with the broker, which can leak the subscriptions of
honest subscribers. This issue was addressed by Rao et al. in
[7], [8]. Since then, all the proposals have assumed that the
broker can not collude with any subscriber [9], [12], [19].
In [8] and [7], Rao et al. use a trusted engine to cloak the
subscriptions before sending to the broker. As a result, the
subscribers get more publications than they require. Although
it is difficult to infer the subscribers’ interests, another round
of matching should be performed on the subscribers to filter
out the redundant publications. Moreover, the trusted engine
can be a bottleneck in the distributed pub/sub system as it
must remain active and uncorrupted throughout the lifetime
of the system.
More recently, Pires et al. [22] present a pub/sub routing
engine that takes advantage of the trusted execution envi-
ronment provided by shielded SGX enclaves [23]. In this
approach, subscriptions are stored in the trusted SGX enclave
and the match operation between interests and tags is also
performed by the SGX enclave. In this case, when the brokers
collude with malicious subscribers or subscribers, they can not
infer other subscriptions, since the brokers can not perform
the search operation. However, the subscribers have to first
send the subscription for re-encryption, which violates the
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Fig. 1. An Overview of Our Proposed System: Three brokers B1, B2, and
B3 in different domains are connected into a virtual cluster. The publishers in
these domains send publications to the cluster. The three brokers in the cluster
perform the matching and routing separately, and finally only the subscribers
whose interests match the tags could get the publications.
decoupling property of the pub/sub systems.
Above all, state of the art pub/sub security solutions have
not considered data injection attack achieved by a compro-
mised publisher. Indeed, a malicious publisher may generate a
malicious publication and try to compromise the privacy of the
interested subscribers by colluding with the broker. To do so,
the malicious publisher colludes with a broker to identify the
subscribers whose interests match the compromised publica-
tion. Hence, the publisher and the broker infer the subscribers’
interests.
III. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
A. Motivating Scenario
In e-health systems, medical entities (such as doctors, hos-
pitals, clinics, and pharmacists) benefit from pub/sub services
by employing private or public brokers to share patients’
Electronic Health Records (EHR).
To effectively diagnose and treat patients, a publisher, say a
doctor from hospital A, may need to share an EHR with other
authorised doctors from hospital B, pharmacists, or a medical
laboratory. In this case, the shared EHR contains personal
information about the patient such as her identity, address,
nature of the test, and file content. This information must be
routed to various health organisations, possibly geographically
separated and in independent administrative domains, where
the patient can be moved when her conditions stabilise or
where the tests have to be performed or analysed.
It is noteworthy that the preservation of the publication’s
confidentiality is not the only security concern. It is crucial to
ensure confidentiality of the publication tags (including name,
address of the patient, and nature of the test), representing
highly sensitive information.
In addition, subscriptions are also highly sensitive infor-
mation as they can reveal which patient is treated by which
clinic or for which type of disease. The system should not
reveal any private information related to a doctor as well as
patients’ EHRs. The disclosure of such information can lead
to serious consequences. For example, an insurance company
learning information about the health state of a patient can
refuse to cover her undergoing medical tests. Basically, to pro-
vide a secure privacy-preserving pub/sub service, the system
should protect the publications’ confidentiality as well as the
subscriptions.
B. System Model
As shown in Fig 1, we consider a privacy-preserving data
pub/sub service involving the following entities:
• Publishers (Pub). The publisher generates publications
and the related tags. Before publishing to the broker, she
encrypts both the tags and the content of the publication.
• Subscribers (Sub). Each subscriber defines a subscription
policy in the form of filters according to her interests,
such that she receives only the publications whose tags
satisfy the subscription policies.
• Broker (B). The broker is responsible for filtering and
delivering publications to the interested Subs.
• Trusted Authority (TA). The trusted authority is respon-
sible for managing the keys of Subs and Pubs.
C. Threat Model
In this work, we consider that the TA is fully trusted and
the channels between the TA and the Pubs/Subs are secure. In
our system, we consider the following threat model:
• Malicious Sub. A malicious Sub may try to access
unauthorised publications and infer other Subs’ interests
by colluding with brokers.
• Malicious Pub. A malicious Pub may try to infer Subs’
interests by injecting malicious publications and collud-
ing with brokers.
• Honest but Curious Broker. The brokers are semi-
trusted (honest-but-curious) in the system. They obey the
protocol to evaluate the filters but they are curious about
the content of publications and interests. Moreover, a
broker may collude with any Sub or Pub to infer the other
Subs’ interests. In our setting, we consider that at least
three brokers should be present to perform the publish
services. Moreover, we assume that the malicious Sub
and Pub could collude with at most two of the brokers.
D. Our Approach
In this paper, we aim at providing a pub/sub service that
could protect publications and Subs’ interests from curious
brokers in the presence of malicious Subs and Pubs.
To achieve R1, i.e., to protect the publications from unautho-
rised entities, the Pub can encrypt the publication using Key-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme [24]. On
the one hand, the confidentiality of the publication can be
protected. On the other hand, the Pub could control the access
over her publications by defining the access control structure.
For achieving R2, tags and interests could be encrypted
using an SE scheme. Thus, the brokers could check if the
publication tags match Subs’ interests in an encrypted manner,
and distribute the publication to authorised Subs (i.e., R3).
Encrypting Sub interests using SE is not sufficient to achieve
R4. As mentioned above, when the broker colludes with
malicious Pubs or Subs, it can infer the honest Subs’ interests
by observing the matching results. The novelty of our proposal
lies in the fact that Subs’ interests are kept protected even when
a broker colludes with a malicious Sub or Pub. Unlike state-
of-the-art pub/sub systems that fundamentally use a single
broker to match and forward the publications to the Subs, our
solution is based on the use of three different types of brokers.
The main idea of this proposal is to divide the matching
operations between interests and tags into three different
phases where each phase is performed by a different type of
broker. Basically, the Sub defines her filter as a tree whose
leaves represent interests and non-leaf nodes denote AND, OR
and NOT gates. The leaves and non-leaf nodes are sent to
two different brokers separately. Furthermore, the leaves are
encrypted with SE and permuted with a keyed Pseudo-Random
Permutation (PRP) before sending to the broker, and the key
of the PRP is sent to the third broker. The broker who gets the
interests is responsible for matching each interest against the
corresponding publication tag in encrypted form. The broker
who gets the key of PRP will recover the order of the matching
results by inverting the permutation. The third broker evaluates
the tree and generates the final matching result. If the Sub’s
interests match the publication’s tags, the third broker forwards
the publication to the Sub.
In our solution, each type of brokers only knows some
partial information, from which sensitive information about
encrypted interests can not be inferred. Thus, if a malicious
Sub or Pub colludes with one or two types of the brokers, they
are unable to infer the interests of honest Subs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In pub/sub systems, publications are disseminated to inter-
ested subscribers through a set of untrusted brokers. These bro-
kers may collect sensitive information by accessing publication
tags and subscribers’ interests. In addition, a malicious broker
can collude with compromised publisher and/or subscribers
to infer subscribers’ interests. To mitigate this issue, we
introduce a novel design of pub/sub systems to protect the
subscribers’ interests against curious brokers. Moreover, the
proposed solution is resistant against the collusion attacks
between a broker and a subscriber.
As future work, we aim to introduce the details of proposed
pub/sub system. In addition, we aim to implement a prototype
to show the feasibility and efficiency of our solution.
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